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Foreword
The Applied Vehicle Technology Panel (AVT) is an 
 international network of defence scientists and engin-
eers dedicated to increasing the performance of new 
and ageing vehicles in the air, sea, land, and space 
 domains. This network consists of about 700 experts 
from all fields of vehicle design, including power and 
propulsion, mechanical structures and material, as 
well as flow physics.
AVT is one of the seven panels of the Collaborative 
Support Oﬃce pertaining to the NATO Science and 
Technology Organization (STO).1 Additionally, the STO 
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is comprised of a dedicated research centre known as 
the Centre of Maritime Research and Experimentation 
(CMRE) as well as the Oﬃce of the Chief Scientist (OCS).
Unmanned vehicles for all domains (UxV) and aspects 
of vehicle autonomy are an important topic in AVT’s 
technical portfolio. This article is based on activities 
performed in AVT and on contributions to a NATO 
 Science and Technology symposium on ‘Autonomous 
Systems’ in fall 2014.3 The article focuses on aerial and 
space vehicles, while many issues and statements may 
also apply to land or maritime systems.
UxV-Autonomy – Definition and Issues
In the last decades, military operations have changed, 
to a major extent, from ‘traditional’ warfare and home-
land defence to asymmetric warfare abroad. Often, 
bel ligerents are not regular armies but groups or organ-
izations following political, ethnic or religious goals 
and acting sometimes as guerrillas or terrorists. Asym-
metric warfare in large and often undeveloped areas 
as well as in urban environments implies a big risk 
for loss of soldiers and uninvolved civilians, a risk that 
is getting less and less acceptable to ‘Blue Nations’ 
 citizens. Therefore, asymmetric military operations 
could be supported by unmanned systems to safely 
enable the application of advanced technology for 
ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance), transportation, protection and pre-
cision strikes on enemy positions / objects. These un-
manned vehicles could be used not only for danger-
ous but also for dull and dirty tasks. Moreover, removal 
of the human from the vehicle removes a vast num-
ber of issues from system design and allows for smaller, 
lighter and more agile craft. Autonomy from an un-
manned system point of view describes the capability 
of a platform to accomplish a pre-defined mission with 
or without further human interaction and / or super-
vision. The degree of autonomy of the unmanned sys-
tem depends on the vehicles’ own abilities of sensing, 
analyzing, communicating, planning, decision-making, 
and acting (altogether forming the intelligence of the 
system), ranging from semi-autonomy to full-auton omy 
and autonomous collaboration.
The mission of a UxV and its complexity determines the 
required degree of autonomy of the system, and vice-
versa, the technologically feasible level of auton omy may 
limit the operational deployment and consequently, 
Figure 1: Contextual autonomous capability (ALFUS Model).2
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the mission parameters. An illustration is given by the 
ALFUS (Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems) 
Model as shown in Figure 1. In this three-axis model, 
the autonomy level is determined by the complexity 
of the mission that a UxV is able to perform, the 
 degrees of diﬃculty of the environment within which 
the UxV is to perform the mission, and the level of 
operator interaction that is required to perform the 
mission. A major challenge for unmanned system 
auton omy is the limitation of risk during operation. 
For example: in the air domain, risk is inherent with 
operation in civil airspace, reliable and precise target 
identification, decision-making for lethal actions and 
collateral damage.
‘Safety and Reliability’ as well as ‘Verification and Valid-
ation’ are major issues regarding unmanned vehicle 
autonomy. Besides fulfilling the operational require-
ments, UxV may have to comply with international / 
national regulations inducing legal and liability issues. 
Related technical challenges also apply to civil devel-
opments such as driverless cars and aerial drones 
(e.g. for delivery of goods). Technical progress from 
the civil side will support and complement related 
military development.
Ethical concerns exist in many countries using both 
UxV and autonomous UxV. These concerns are based 
on the false public perception that autonomy is a syno-
nym for decision-making or lethal action by an un-
manned vehicle. Quite contrary to this misconception, 
the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) defines a fully autonomous system as being 
cap able of accomplishing its assigned mission, within 
a de fined scope, without human intervention while 
adapt ing to operational and environmental conditions. 
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Figure 2: Categories of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).
‘Autonomy from an unmanned system  
point of view describes the capability of a 
platform to accomplish a pre-defined  
mission with or without further human  
interaction and/or supervision.’
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Furthermore, it defines a semi-autonomous system as 
being capable of performing autonomous operations 
with various levels of human interaction.4 This issue can-
not be solved by technical means but must be based 
on political and public discussion and consensus. This 
significant topic is beyond the scope of this article and, 
therefore, will not be further treated here.
UxV Autonomy (Air and Space) –  
State of the Art
Many modern weapons feature a kind of autonomy 
for the whole or a part of their mission, when they fly 
to a pre-determined and localized target by autopilot 
(e.g. cruise missiles) using inertial navigation, GPS and / 
or terrain mapping for guidance or when they follow 
and intercept a target after lock-on of the onboard 
seeker (e.g. air-to-air missiles). Even when those sys-
tems act fully or partly without human interaction, 
this feature is automation rather than autonomy. 
Identification / localization of the target and the de-
cision to destroy the target are made by humans 
 prior to the use of the weapon. Figure 2 shows cat-
egories of unmanned aerial vehicles over typical 
Mach numbers and altitudes of operation. Mini-UAV, 
small / tactical UAV, Medium and High Altitude Long 
Endurance UAV (MALE and HALE) are state-of-the-art 
and systems are operational and deployed within 
NATO. Micro UAV, Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 
(UCAV) and hypersonic strike vehicles (i.e. a hyper-
sonic cruise missile) are in a state of technology dem-
onstration with a Technical Readiness Level (TRL)5 
typically lower than seven (TRL seven means proto-
type demonstration in operational environment). 
Operational UAVs are mainly used for ISR. To a limited 
extent, MALE UAVs can be equipped with missiles 
or bombs just like a conventional piloted military air-
craft. These UAV have a high degree of automation 
following a course which is pre-determined or com-
manded / altered by an operator in the Ground Con-
trol Station (GCS), again using inertial navigation and 
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GPS. For MALE and HALE, the GCS is typically con-
nected via a satellite link and located far outside 
 enemy territory. Tactical UAV are typically launched 
by catapults or rocket boosters and return to their 
launch site to land remotely piloted or by parachute. 
MALE and HALE take oﬀ and land like a conventional 
aircraft and need a similar runway. They are mostly 
capable of automatic take-oﬀ and landing, but are 
typically monitored by an on-site operator. These UAV 
can be called semi-autonomous, when they operate 
on commands (e.g. course / course corrections, direc-
tion of sensors, designation of objects, destruction of 
targets etc.) instead of being remotely controlled, but 
‘intelligence’ and decision-making is still the role of 
the human operator. 
In particular, MALE and HALE systems may be re-
quired to operate in a non-segregated airspace at 
least for a part of their mission. This induces the need 
for autonomous actions to avoid mid-air collisions 
and to ensure an appropriate self-separation from 
other airspace users. This issue relates to safety and 
reliability, to verification and validation, as well as 
 certification, and it may be a show stopper for acqui-
sition, as recently experienced with the German 
 EUROHAWK project. Figure 2 also shows two qualita-
tive examples for autonomy in the  ALFUS model.
The MALE mission is complex in all aspects named in 
the model. The environment may be complex in terms 
of terrain (mountain regions) or climate, but especially 
in terms of threat, because the vehicle speed is quite 
slow (around Mach 0.3) and it operates at altitudes 
 accessible to many Air Defence systems. Accordingly, 
the degree of autonomy is on the lower side.
Figure 3: Evolution of Vehicle Autonomy.
‘These concerns are based on the false public 
perception that autonomy is a synonym  
for decision-making or lethal action by an 
unmanned vehicle’
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The hypersonic strike mission would be less complex 
and quite similar to cruise missiles today. Flight con-
trol will be more complex due to hypersonic aero-
dynamics and propulsion control. The hypersonic 
flight environ ment is, of course, very demanding, but 
threats by Air De fence should be lower. Expected 
auton omy will be on the higher side, covered by a 
smart autopilot system.
Space vehicles require some autonomous capabilities, 
since, depending on their orbit, they may have limited 
connectivity to their ground station for receiving com-
mands. Those autonomous capabilities may include:
??Entry into a ‘safe hold’ mode in order to protect 
themselves from potential damage due to anomal-
ous conditions;
??Routine operations such as momentum wheel de-
saturation, sensor pointing at pre-programmed tar-
gets, and similar activities;
??Propulsive maneuvers to stay in the desired orbit, that 
are pre-programmed and then executed autonomously.
Again, this is more about automation than autonomy 
in the sense of ‘intelligence’.
UxV Autonomy (Air and Space) –  
The Future
In the future, more and more UxV autonomy will be 
required to increase eﬀectivity and to lower the work-
load and endangerment of humans. Figure 3 illustrates 
the potential future trend:
??Today, there is a man-machine interaction, wherein 
the human retains the main parts of command and 
control. The UxV performs the commanded actions 
based on automated routines and sends a stream of 
information back, which is processed at the GCS and 
supports the derivation of command updates. 
??The next step will be a system wherein human and 
machine work together as a team. They act together 
to achieve an objective, of course, still determined by 
the human part. They share information and the UxV 
will act more independently while the human re-
tains direction but does less monitoring and control. 
Technology is gradually shifting in this direction.
??A second large step into the future would be a 
 system-of-systems approach, wherein humans and 
UxV work together as a group performing a joint 
task. Direction will still remain with the human, but 
Figure 4: Key Autonomy Issues and Implications for Platform / Vehicle Aspects.
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the role will be similar to a commander of a unit. The 
UxV will act with a high degree of autonomy com-
bined with highly complex communication. As an 
example, this could be a group of UCAV fighting 
 together with some conventionally piloted aircraft 
and supported by ground, air, or space-based ISR 
assets. The operational future includes autonomous 
collaboration amongst diﬀerent systems sharing 
 required information for mutual situational aware-
ness. This stage implies a large number of issues, 
which are not all of a technical nature and will not 
be achieved in the near future. The understanding 
of the potential of autonomous collaboration is still 
in its infancy.
Increasing the autonomy of UxV requires an increase 
of on-board capabilities for
??Situational awareness;
??Fast decision-making and response to dynamic situ-
ations and environments; and
??Communication (speed, multi party, electronic counter-
measures, etc.).
Technically, this means a demand for highly en-
hanced on-board sensing and processing capabilities 
and potentially for larger data link bandwidth to cope 
with multi party communication. Vehicle  design will 
have to accommodate more and larger / heavier com-
ponents and a significantly increased power demand. 
This will necessarily lead to larger and heavier ve-
hicles, where limitations exist for space and airborne 
vehicles. Also, the requirements for safety, reliability 
and low vulnerability will likely increase for more 
auton omously acting and more complex and costly 
UxV. This will aggravate the issues with verification 
and validation as well as certification. A tradeoﬀ will 
have to be made between benefits from increased 
vehicle autonomy and competing design, cost and 
certification implications.
Progress in the direction of human-machine teams or 
systems of systems raises additional issues of:
??Shared situational perception and assessment;
??Mutual understanding of behaviour (human and 
machine).
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Stability & Control Analyses to understand the Aerodynamic Behaviour of UAVs Ranging From Micro UAVs to MALE, 
HALE and UCAVs (AVT-161, AVT-184, AVT-201, AVT-202, AVT-ET-143, AVT-ET-144).
Innovative Control Technologies (AVT-239).
An AVT Specialists Meeting will address the specific technological and operational issues connected to UGVs (AVT-241).
Qualification and Structural Design Guideline for Military UAVs (AVT-174); guideline is applied in diﬀerent NATO and 
NATO nations activities.
Analysis of airworthiness and certification requirements for UAVs taking into account NATO STANAGs and the present 
state of regulations among NATO nations (AVT-ET-147).
Exploration of procedures for the assessment of system mission performance as a function of platform autonomy for 
unmanned land, sea, and air vehicles as current methodologies are insuﬃcient (AVT-175) with the results:
??Development of two new methods for performance assessment.
??A new performance assessment tool that predicts platform unmanned systems performance for a given mission and 
environment at a given specific autonomy level.
??Mission Performance Potential (MPP) tool (described in the Technical Report of AVT-175).
??MPP separates autonomy level and mission performance to provide a predictive measure of a UMS’s expected 
performance for a mission and level of autonomy.
??An AVT-175 follow on activity will validate the MPP algorithms against actual data from UMS testing, competitions, 
and in-theater deployments.
Inducing problems with modelling / simulation and 
pre dictability of such scenarios being totally unre-
solved today. Fully autonomous systems, completely 
independent from human directions, are unlikely to 
be realized in the foreseeable future.
Moving towards more autonomous UxV will require
??Investment in critical technologies; 
??Development of new policies and procedures for 
auton omous operations;
??A paradigm shift in operational philosophy and risk 
acceptance.
AVT Engagement in  
Platform Autonomy Topics
Figure 4 illustrates how key autonomy issues impact plat-
form / vehicle requirements and design as outline above. 
The technical fields ‘Propulsion and Power Systems’, ‘Mech-
anical Systems, Structures and Materials’ and ‘Perfor-
mance, Stability and Control, Fluid Physics’ represent the 
portfolio of the three technical committees of the AVT 
Panel. Related technical issues of vehicle autonomy (as 
shown in Fig. 4) are addressed in these technical com-
mittees, while other autonomy issues may fall into the 
portfolio of other panels of the NATO S&T Organization1.
Table 1: Recent and current AVT activities in the field of UxV.
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Recent and current AVT activities in the field of UxV 
are listed in Table 1. 
Documentation of completed activities is available for 
members of NATO nations on the NATO S&T Website 
https://www.cso.nato.int
Conclusions
Unmanned platforms will become increasingly more 
important for all types of operations. Tactical UAV 
as well as MALE and HALE systems are operational 
for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance pur-
poses. The larger aerial systems can be weaponized 
and destroy identified targets. These UxV feature 
a high degree of automation which enables a semi-
autonomous operation, while ‘intelligence’ and de-
cision-making is retained by the human operator. The 
same is true for space based systems. Many issues 
discussed in this article also apply to land or maritime 
unmanned systems.
When operation of automated / autonomous UxV 
inter feres with civil airspace (or shipping traﬃc), major 
issues arise with safety and reliability, verification and 
validation as well as certification.
Artificial Intelligence has to be transferred to the un-
manned platform to increase the autonomous capabil-
ities. Platform survivability is a key military capability 
especially for complex missions where a higher degree 
of autonomy is required for smart decision-making to 
avoid potential threats. Additional equipment for 
sensing, data processing, communications and power 
generation / power storage is needed for this purpose, 
with the drawback of increasing the size and mass 
and complexity of the unmanned platform. Moreover, 
the stability and control characteristics of the platform 
need to be precisely predicted to provide the required 
data for autonomous operations. 
Looking in the direction of humans as part of a system-
of-systems approach, operational complexity as well 
as predictability of such scenarios and the safety and 
reliability issue will pose limitations unlikely to be 
overcome in the near future. Various aspects of un-
manned platform autonomy have been covered by 
activities of the AVT Panel of the NATO S&T organiza-
tion. Key issues are currently addressed such as UxV 
certification, stability & control prediction methods 
as well as the assessment of system mission perfor-
mance as a function of platform autonomy, which will 
allow a trade-oﬀ between eﬀectiveness of operation 
and inherent technical and commercial investment 
and risk. 
1. The STO is governed by the NATO Science & Technology Board (STB), which is chaired by the NATO Chief 
Scientist. For further details, please consult the STO website at http://www.sto.nato.int.
2. Hui-Min Huang, Kerry Pavek, Brian Novak, James Albus, and Elena Messina, ‘A Framework For Autonomy 
Levels For Unmanned Systems (ALFUS)’, Proceedings of the AUVSI’s Unmanned Systems North America 
2005, Jun. 2005, Baltimore, Maryland.
3. NATO S&T Symposium, STB-ES ‘Autonomous Systems’, Bratislava (SLK), 19 Sep., 2014.
4. National Institute of Standards and Technology, US Department of Commerce (http://www.nist.gov/el/
isd/ks/upload/NISTSP_1011-I-2-0.pdf).
5. Cf. Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Guidance, United States Department of Defense, Apr. 2011.
‘Fully autonomous systems, completely in-
dependent from human directions, are unlikely  
to be realized in the foreseeable future.’
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